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This paper presents results of the research project ‘Determinants of democratic states’ 
handling of conflicting objectives in democracy promotion’ jointly conducted by PRIF and 
Goethe University Frankfurt and supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG). It 
draws on a comparative content analysis of German and US policy documents conducted by 
Annika E. Poppe and Bentje Woitschach (see A.E. Poppe, B. Woitschach and J. Wolff, 
‘Freedom Fighter versus Civilian Power: an ideal-type comparison of US and German 
conceptions of democracy promotion’, in J. Wolff, H.-J. Spanger and H.-J. Puhle (eds.), The 
Comparative International Politics of Democracy Promotion [London: Routledge, 
forthcoming]). A previous version of the paper was presented at the BISA Annual Conference 
2011 in Manchester. I thank Cemal Karakas, Hans-Joachim Spanger and Bentje Woitschach 
for helpful comments.  
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While Germany is generally considered one of the most important democracy promoters, 
there is still limited work on the German approach to promoting democracy. There is a 
general understanding that Germany – as a Civilian Power – should be guided by democratic 
values in its external affairs, but neither theoretically nor empirically it is very clear what this 
means for the actual practice of democracy promotion. The present paper contributes to 
filling this gap by (1) locating democracy promotion as a foreign-policy aim and instrument 
in the concept of Civilian Power, (2) summarising the fragmented state of the art on German 
democracy promotion, (3) presenting results of a qualitative content analysis in order to 
reconstruct the main features of the official outline of German democracy promotion, and (4) 
confronting these programmatic findings with a brief comparative view on the practice of 
German democracy promotion towards Bolivia, Turkey and Russia. 
 
1. Introduction 
The foreign policy of states is shaped by a series of most different factors.
1
 According to an 
extensive scholarship generally based on some kind of constructivist reasoning, the particular 
socio-cultural domestic context is one crucial determinant, whether it is conceptualised in 




 or, more general, political culture.
4
 
When it comes to Germany, the concept of Civilian Power, devised by Hanns W. Maull, is the 
most prominent attempt to grasp the specific features that characterise German foreign policy 
culture.
5
 From this perspective, German foreign policy aims at actively ‘civilising’ 
international relations by trying ‘to replace the military enforcement of rules (politics based 




Whether applying the specific concept of Civilian Power or not, other scholars working on 
German foreign and security policies have largely confirmed the general argument.
7
 Although 
the evolution of German foreign policy since 1990 in general – and German participation in 
the Kosovo War in 1999 in particular – provoked a debate on whether Germany was gradually 
abandoning its ‘civilian’ foreign policy culture,
8
 most observers see ‘“modified continuity” 
rather than fundamental change’.
9
 Some crucial changes with regard to foreign policy means 
(like the use of military force) coexist with a basic continuity in Germany’s foreign policy 
aims.
10
 According to the mainstream view, both continuity and change in German foreign 




Broad consensus has it that, since the end of the Cold War, democracy promotion has become 
an important aim and strategy of the foreign and development policies of most democratic 
states, including Germany.
12
 Yet, up to now, democracy promotion scholarship has largely 
focused on the United States and the European Union. There is, therefore, limited work on the 
German approach to democracy promotion (including on the question whether there is indeed 
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a specific one). Likewise, the literature on (Germany as a) Civilian Power has hardly dealt 
with democracy promotion. The present paper contributes to filling this gap by doing four 
things. In a first conceptual step, democracy promotion as a foreign-policy aim and instrument 
is theoretically located in the concept of Civilian Power. Second, the paper summarises the 
fragmented state of the art on German democracy promotion in order to see whether empirical 
observations confirm theoretical expectations. Third, results of a qualitative content analysis 
are presented in order to reconstruct the main features of the official outline of German 
democracy promotion. Fourth, these programmatic findings are confronted with a brief 
comparative view on the practice of German democracy promotion towards three different 




2. ‘Civilian’ democracy promotion: Conceptual issues and ambivalent expectations 
In the academic writings on Civilian Power, references to values, norms and rights abound. 
Yet, the proper place and shape of democracy promotion – understood as all those measures 
taken by an external actor that are explicitly ‘aimed at establishing, strengthening, or 
defending democracy in a given country’
14
 – in the foreign (and development) policies of an 
ideal-type Civilian Power are far from clear-cut. According to Kirste and Maull, Civilian 
Powers do not rule out ‘the meddling in the internal affairs of other states’, and the promotion 
of good governance and democratization is even considered an ‘avowed aim’.
15
 Democracy 
promotion is, however, not among a Civilian Power’s guiding principles. The latter include 
constraining the use of force in handling political conflicts; strengthening international law, 
international norms and international regimes; intensifying multilateral cooperation with 
inclusive participation and a partial transfer of sovereignty; and promoting social justice at the 
global level.
16
 The problem, now, is that democracy promotion is not just an additional aim 
which can be considered as complimentary (if secondary) to the guiding principles mentioned. 
In a world that is not only made up of democracies, an active ‘meddling in the internal affairs 
of other states’ in order to promote the democratization of non-democratic regimes clashes 
both with the respect for the norm of collective self-determination and sovereignty as well as 
with the aims to establish mutual trust and maintain international peace by cooperating with 
all real-existing states in an inclusive international order.
17
 To the extent that there is a 
‘tension inherent in the Civilian Power concept, pertaining to the question of whether the 
pursuit of peace or the defence of democratic rights should take priority’,
18
 there can be no 
doubt that a Civilian Power should be expected to privilege the former. 
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This is not to say that a Civilian Power will not promote democracy but, given the priorities 
assumed by the literature,
19
 it will be only reluctantly do so and focus on accompanying 
ongoing processes of democratization, establishing positive incentives, and relying on 
collective, multilateral means. The prime interest is in using international cooperation as a 
means of civilising world politics which implies both the inclusion of non-democratic regimes 
and the rejection of unilateral action. A Civilian Power’s ‘value-oriented foreign policy’
20
 will 
less focus on explicitly promoting democracy as a particular (and contested) type of political 
rule but more on supporting human rights in a rather broad notion of ‘universal values’.
21
 
In a recent piece, Thomas Carothers has identified ‘two distinct overall approaches to 
assisting democracy: the political approach and the development approach’. The former is 
characterised by ‘a relatively narrow conception of democracy – focused, above all, on 
elections and political liberties – and a view of democratization as a process of political 
struggle in which democrats work to gain the upper hand in society over nondemocrats’; 
democracy assistance, here, is directed ‘at core political processes and institutions […] often 
at important conjunctural moments and with the hope of catalytic effects’. The developmental 
approach, by contrast, quite nicely fits the expectations for a Civilian Power. It ‘rests on a 
broader notion of democracy, one that encompasses concerns about equality and justice and 
the concept of democratization as a low, iterative process of change involving an interrelated 
set of political and socioeconomic developments’ while favouring ‘democracy aid that 
pursues incremental, long-term change in a wide range of political and socioeconomic sectors, 
frequently emphasizing governance and the building of a well-functioning state’.
22
 A broad 
notion of democracy fits much better with human rights as established at the international 
level (which are not narrowly defined in liberal terms, but include civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights). A gradual, evolutionary and complex conception of 
democratization corresponds to the whole notion of ‘civilising’ international relations which 
draws on Norbert Elias’ sociological analysis of the civilising process – the century-long, 
non-linear process of pacifying European societies.
23
 
In this sense, an ideal-type conception of democracy promotion by a Civilian Power can be 
characterised by the following four features: It would (1) be based on a rather abstract and 
broad notion of universal values and rights; (2) conceive of democratization as a long-term, 
evolutionary process of complex transformation; (3) privilege pragmatic strategies of 
(institutional) cooperation and inclusion; and (4) be relatively reluctant to openly meddle in 






3. German democracy promotion: The fragmented state of the art 
In line with the Civilian Power concept, German governments regularly characterise their 
foreign (and development) policies as ‘value-oriented’. Usually, however, it is not very clear 
to what extent this value-orientation includes an explicit focus on democracy promotion. 
In general, Germany has been portrayed as a reluctant – late-coming and selective – 
democracy promoter.
25
 Before 1990, German democracy promotion was mainly the business 
of the political party foundations.
26
 Development aid at that time ‘pursued a rather apolitical, 
technical approach’ and, on the macro level, aimed ‘at keeping developing countries in the 
western camp’.
27
 Likewise, ‘human rights rhetoric in German foreign policy was mainly used 
as an instrument in the ideological conflict with the Soviet Union and the GDR’.
28
 It was the 
‘third wave of democratization’
29
 and, in particular, the end of the Cold War that ‘changed the 
parameters of Germany’s approach to democracy promotion’.
30
 Since 1990, German 
governments have increasingly emphasised human rights as an important guideline for their 
foreign and development policies. In 1991, the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development introduced political conditionalities related to human rights, the rule of law and 
political participation. These conditions, however, were rather soft criteria for evaluating 
partner countries than hard preconditions.
31
 The Foreign Office, in 1992, created a democracy 
promotion facility which focused on funding election observer missions.
32
 In the course of the 
1990s, the GTZ – the agency (now GIZ) implementing Germany’s official technical 
cooperation – adopted an increasingly political democracy and governance assistance as part 
of German development cooperation.
33
 
More than other ‘donors’, the German government has been emphasising that democratization 
‘should not be limited to holding more or less free elections’ but requires broader attention to 
human rights, the Rechtsstaat (rule of law) and civil society.
34
 As the Civilian Power 
approach would expect, discourse and practice of German democracy promotion in the 1990s 
are described as rather reluctant as to the political meddling in internal affairs of other states: 
German democracy assistance activities have been focusing on good governance, the rule of 
law, decentralization and administration; the Foreign Office, if it considered democracy 
promotion at all, viewed it as part of its broader human rights policies.
35
 In 1996, Gero 
Erdmann concluded that the Development Ministry preferred to talk about human rights and 
not democracy promotion, while the Foreign Office largely limited democracy promotion to 
selective activities of technical electoral support.
36
 In official rhetoric both the Foreign Office 
and the Development Ministry emphasised that they were guided – in line with United 
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Nations’ norms – by a broad notion of human rights comprising both the civil-political and 
the social, economic and cultural rights, even if with an implicit preference for the former.
37
 
This reluctance vis-à-vis an openly political approach to promoting democracy is well in line 
with the expectations for a Civilian Power.
38
 The same holds true for the German focus on 
positive capacity-building activities, i.e. on democracy assistance.
39
 In terms of political 
conditionalities, Germany has been prioritising a rather ‘soft conditionality’ while preferring 
dialogue, incentives and long-term strategies of taking influence; coercive measures have 
been (and are) the exception.
40
 Negative sanctions as a means to promote (or protect) 
democracy were – and are – used only ‘very selectively, occasionally half-heartedly, 
inconsistently, and situationally’.
41
 This cautious and selective use of sanctions has 
traditionally been justified by an evolutionary, modernisation-theory argument: The support 
for economic growth and reforms – e.g., in China – was supposed to lead to political reforms 
in the middle to long run.
42
 
According to Lapins, German democracy promotion is ‘long-term in conception’, ‘not 
missionary’ but ‘as a policy of the good example’.
43
 The Foreign Office, in particular, prefers 
indirect measures, above all to avoid confrontation and the charge of interfering in other 
states’ internal affairs.
44
 Well in line with the ambivalent expectations outlined in Section 2, 
German human rights policy was far more consistent in strengthening international human 
rights norms within the United Nations than in terms of reacting to human rights violations in 
other countries.
45
 Nicely summarising German preferences, the coalition agreement between 
Christian Democrats and Social Democrats in 2005 highlighted ‘bilateral dialogues about the 
rule of law [Rechtsstaatsdialoge], measures to strengthen civil society, and democracy 
promotion in the multilateral framework’.
46
 The role of the German political foundations – 
that are still important actors in implementing German democracy assistance – adds to this 
because their work has traditionally aimed at promoting dialogue, education and inclusive 
exchange with a view to enabling long-term processes of political development.
47
 
These features characterising German democracy promotion since 1990 correspond not only 
to the culturally embedded profile of a Civilian Power, but also to the material interests of a 
heavily export-oriented middle power.
48
 Germany’s cautious approach to democracy 
promotion quite obviously responds to economic considerations related to German trade and 
investment; political pressure and economic sanctions are regularly rejected when – as with 
China and Russia – such economic interests are threatened.
49
 In this sense, to the extent that 
the German conception of democracy promotion corresponds to the notion of a Civilian 
Power, this does not mean that Germany’s political culture does prevail over tangible 
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‘national interests’. At least with a view to the general pattern of German democracy 
promotion, cultural predispositions and hegemonic discourses, on the one hand, and material 
interests, on the other, seem to reinforce each other. In specific situations, however, both may 
clash – and case studies, here, will have to show the extent to which ‘culture’ shapes policies 
even when in conflict with perceived tangible interests (see Section 5). 
 
4. German democracy promotion in official rhetoric: Results of a content analysis 
The content analysis presented here systematically screened a selection of 20 primary sources 
(documents and speeches issued by the German government) dealing both with the general 
guidelines of German foreign, defence and development policy and with German democracy 
promotion policies in particular.
50
 The aim was to see whether the German conception of 
democracy promotion as outlined in official rhetoric confirms the four specific expectations 
for the democracy promotion profile of a Civilian Power (see Section 2). 
(1) The results show that in German documents, in fact, references to rather abstract and 
broad universal values and rights predominate. 13 text passages were coded accordingly 
(representing 7 per cent of all codes). Examples include references to ‘human dignity’,
51
 ‘the 
democratic values and basic principles’
52
 or human rights in general.
53
 The Development 
Ministry explicitly emphasises that Germany does ‘not promote a particular form of 
democracy’, ‘but the implementation of democratic and rule-of-law principles’.
54
 Only two 
references were coded as declaring the universality of democracy. In one instance, the BMZ 
quotes then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan who called democracy a ‘universal right’ – but 
the Ministry refrains from explicitly embracing this notion.
55
 Just as expectations for a 
Civilian Power would have it, the German government, thus, does not unilaterally proclaim a 
universal right to democracy but takes international norms – as represented by the UN 
Secretary-General – as the point of departure for conceiving its democracy promotion agenda. 
In the second text passage coded as ’democracy universal’, the Defence Ministry emphasises 
freedom, law and human dignity as the universally binding core of human rights.
56
 This 
combination of concepts can be interpreted as an indirect, if substantial reference to 
democracy. Yet again, it is notable that democracy as such is not mentioned.
57
 
Generally, German rhetoric is characterised by a close relation between democracy and the 
Rechtsstaat (rule of law) which are often mentioned together.
58
 The normative principles that 
are said as guiding German foreign policy include democratic values and human dignity as 
well broadly understood (political, civil, economic, social and cultural) human rights – 





(2) In terms of the conception of democratization, the German documents include not a single 
reference to short-term transitions to democracy, revolutionary processes of change, or 
‘democratic breakthroughs’.
60
 Democratization is consistently characterised as a long-term 
process of gradual change that has to grow from within the respective society. According to 
the BMZ, democratization encompasses ‘long-term structural changes that establish better 
preconditions so that projects and reforms in traditional sectors are viable and sustainable’.
61
 
These are ‘protracted processes’ where setbacks are always possible.
62
 Explicitly turning 
away from the Transition Paradigm,
63
 the Development Ministry’s democracy promotion 
strategy does not mention the transition to democracy as a relevant phase of democratization 
(or a noteworthy aim of democracy promotion), but speaks about ‘hybrid’ regimes only.
64
 
(3) The preference for cooperation and inclusion (instead of confrontation and exclusion) was 
analyzed with a view to the stance towards non-democratic actors. In comparison to US 
rhetoric, German documents relatively rarely characterise non-democratic countries or groups 
as ‘enemies’ and comparatively rarely argue in favour of their exclusion or marginalisation.
65
 
Still, it is surprising that Germany advocates ‘exclusion’ more frequently than ‘inclusion’. 
This, however, is almost entirely due to references to terrorism.
66
 When dealing with 
terrorists, Germany does adopt a non-inclusionary approach. In and of itself, this is not a 
contrast to the Civilian Power approach. As Peter Katzenstein has demonstrated, the German 
approach to counterterrorism is about actively combating global terrorism but sees this largely 
as a fight against crime – not as a war as the US would have it.
67
 
If text passages related to terrorism are taken out, inclusion is clearly the predominant 
strategy. Exclusion is at best the very last option.
68
 Confronted with ‘countries in which the 
government impedes or hinders the democratic will-formation by taking arbitrary measures 
(violating human rights, freedom of opinion etc.)’, the Development Ministry provides for a 
policy dialogue in order to push the corresponding government ‘to open or broaden the room 
for a socio-political reform discussion’.
69
 As long as authoritarian ‘partner governments’ 
refuse to liberalise politically, official German democracy promotion as implemented by the 
government is to be narrowed down to indirect measures: It ‘takes the existing order [in the 
partner country] as a starting point and, for the time being, accepts the given correlations of 
power’; it is to work with a ‘long-term’ orientation aiming at a ‘improvements in governance 
and administration’, a ‘professionalization of the political system and the rule of law’.
70
 The 
politically sensitive and potentially confrontational direct support for processes of political 
reform and liberalisation is, under such conditions, ‘first and foremost the business of non-
state actors’.
71
 In general, the official principles guiding German democracy promotion – 
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‘dialogue’, ‘long-term commitment’ and ‘mutual trust’ based ‘on shared value orientations’ – 
are entirely focused on cooperation.
72
 
(4) The German reluctance to openly speak democracy promotion – noted in Section 3 – is 
confirmed by the general observation that in general relatively few text passages were coded 
in the German documents. The whole topic – democracy, democratization, democracy 
promotion – is far less present in German official rhetoric than, e.g., in the US case.
73
 More 
specifically, a frequency analysis for the use of the terms ‘freedom/liberty’, ‘democracy’ and 
‘rule of law’ (Rechtsstaat) revealed that the US governments mention ‘freedom/liberty’ three 
times as much as German governments, ‘democracy’ twice as much, and ‘rule of law’ almost 
equally.
74
 Correspondingly, German documents frequently avoid talking about democracy 
(promotion) as an aim by relying on indirect references that somehow imply democracy.
75
 If 
democracy (promotion) is explicitly mentioned, it is usually embedded in a broader context of 
societal development and a correspondingly general development agenda.
76
 Conceptual 
vagueness is further aggravated as documents frequently refer to series of not really 
delineated principles and aims: ‘freedom’, ‘law’ and ‘human dignity’
77
 or ‘empowerment, 
participation and non-discrimination as well as transparency and accountability’.
78
 Typical for 
Germany’s cautious approach to democracy promotion is that not only ‘direct’ but also 
‘indirect’ strategies are included in the democracy promotion strategy. Such indirect 
democracy promotion aims at contributing to the ‘output legitimation’ or the ‘performance’ of 
the state
79




Finally, the literature review in Section 3 suggested that Germany since 1990 has adopted – if 
reluctantly so – an increasingly explicit stance towards democracy promotion with more and 
more ministries, agencies, instruments and resources being somehow geared to this aim.
81
 The 
content analysis provides some statistical evidence for such a gradual change in time, i.e., 
increasing references to the active promotion of democracy. When comparing the distribution 
of codes in the documents with the average distribution in US documents, the rhetoric of the 
Kohl government (coalition between Christian Democrats and Liberals, until 1998) clearly 
differs from the US profile, while correlations between the US average and the governments 
led by Gerhard Schröder (coalition between Social Democrats and Greens, 1998-2005) and 
Angela Merkel (coalition between Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, 2005-2009) 






5. German democracy promotion in practice: A glimpse at three case studies 
If the profile of German foreign policy – in general and with a particular view to democracy 
promotion – largely complies with the model of a Civilian Power, then the corresponding 
normative dispositions should shape German policies towards most different countries. 
Without claiming to really test this proposition, this section assesses its plausibility by briefly 
reviewing the results of three case studies on German democracy promotion policies: towards 
Bolivia, Turkey, and Russia. 
In all three countries, German (and, in general, ‘North-Western’) democracy promotion 
policies recently had to deal with crucial challenges. In Bolivia, the 2005 election of Evo 
Morales as the first indigenous president of the country led to the dismantling of the 
democratic institutions that had been established in the 1980s and 1990s – and that were 
previously supported by Germany. The new constitution pushed by Morales, while still 
basically democratic, at least partially deviates from German conceptions of liberal 
democracy, the rule of law and market economy. The same holds true for the changes in 
economic policies (including ‘nationalisations’) promoted by President Morales which, in one 
case, directly hurt the interests of a German company.
83
 In Turkey, it is the rise of political 
Islam that has challenged German policies. On the one hand, the political success of pro-
Islamic parties in Turkey presented not only a direct threat to the Kemalist elite (and, 
therefore, the stability of the Turkish state), but was also perceived (in Germany) as a 
potential risk for the secular democratic order and for Turkey’s strategic orientation towards 
the West. On the other hand, it was the Justice and Development Party (AKP) which, since 
2002, has promoted both political and economic reforms just along the lines demanded by the 
European Union (EU) and Germany.
84
 With a view to Russia, Germany has vital interests in 
(economic) cooperation and in preventing domestic instability. Both interests clearly have 
been served by the political rise and leadership of Vladimir Putin since 1999. At the same 
time, Putin embarked on a path of gradual authoritarianization which led to increasing 
German concerns as to Russia’s political development – and, in particular, provoked 
increasing domestic criticism within Germany directed against the German government’s 
attitude towards Putin’s Russia.
85
 
The general pattern characterising German reactions to these most different processes of 
political change is one of pragmatic cooperation. In the Bolivian case, Germany largely 
supported the Morales government and its reform project, including by adjusting its 
democracy assistance. It basically accepted the democratically legitimated deviance from 
German preferences in terms of both the political regime and economic policies but, by 
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engaging the new government, tried to temper the political changes in order to prevent them 
from deviating too much from German conceptions of liberal democracy, human rights and 
market economy. At the same time, Germany tried to refrain from openly interfering in 
sensitive issues of domestic politics; privileged a conflict-sensitive approach of do no harm to 
a dogmatic emphasis on democratic and rule-of-law standards; and focused on supporting 
inclusive processes of dialogue and concertation.
86
 
In the case of Turkey, after some initial doubts as to threats to the secular order, the German 
government came to see the AKP government as a guarantor for democracy and stability as 
well as for an EU-oriented reform process. When reacting to domestic challenges to AKP 
rule,
87
 Germany explicitly supported the democratically legitimated government. In fact, it 
was not so much Turkish domestic politics (e.g., the alleged threat of an Islamisation and 
authoritarianization pushed by the AKP) but changes in Turkish foreign policies (e.g., 
rapprochement with Iran and Syria and alienation from Israel) that met with German 
criticism. German development cooperation – including democracy assistance with a focus on 
the public sector – continued.
88
 
In the Russian case, continuity is the main feature characterising German policy. Given a 
strong German interest in ensuring continuing cooperation with Russia, normative concerns as 
to the political situation in Russia have had a limited impact on actual policies at best. 
Opposition parties have regularly joined the media and human rights groups in demanding a 
much less sympathetic German attitude towards Putin’s Russia, but once in power they 
quickly chose pragmatic continuity. To the extent that the democracy issue is relevant at all, it 
is treated through dialogue. In terms of democracy assistance, the German political 
foundations are in part working with opposition groups, but in general focus on supporting 
political dialogue and long-term change.
89
 
This picture – general and underspecified as it is – largely confirms the notion of a Civilian 
Power Germany. However, such a ‘cultural’ narrative only tells one part of the story. As 
already mentioned above, the cultural or normative predispositions represented by the 
Civilian Power concept are, at the same time, quite in line with the ‘classical’ tangible 
interests the literature assumes to guide Germany’s foreign policy. This argument – that the 
Civilian Power represents not so much a ‘purely’ ideational phenomenon but one in which 
interests and norms are articulated in particular ways – is clearly supported by the three case 
studies. In the Bolivian case, the ‘civilian’ way of promoting democracy was enabled by the 
almost complete absence of any tangible German interests.
90
 The one (minor) case where a 
German company was affected by ‘nationalisation’ led to intense activities by the German 
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embassy and even Chancellor Merkel – Germany, in fact, suspended a development 
cooperation project.
91
 This suggests that the reaction to Morales probably would have been 
much less benign and tolerant in the case of a significant harm to German economic interests. 
Yet, even this clearly interest-driven support of a German company could be justified 
normatively in terms of Germany’s approach to democracy promotion: According to the 
official German discourse, private property rights are a crucial element of the rule of law (the 
Rechtsstaat) and, as seen above, democracy and the rule of law are inextricably linked. Thus, 
the sanction against Bolivia in defence of German economic interests, at the same time, could 
be presented as support for ‘democracy and the rule of law’ in Bolivia. 
In the case of Turkey, Germany’s increasing scepticism as to Turkey’s accession to the EU 
does not fit well with the alleged aim to promote Turkish democracy.
92
 For a Civilian Power, 
the ‘socialisation’ into international (democratic) norms via the EU accession process should 
be the privileged strategy – a strategy that is clearly undermined by the rejection of a potential 
accession by the Christian Democrats which have been heading the German government since 
2005. While this position is clearly driven by partisan interests – especially in benefiting from 
Islamophobic and anti-Turkish sentiments in the German population –, it is mainly justified in 
normative terms: In line with the Civilian Power concept, Turkey is presented as not living up 
to the normative standards of the EU, and Turkey’s accession is said to threaten the EU, i.e. 
the institution that is seen as the most important achievement in the process of civilising 
international relations. However, the fact remains that the culturalist argument put forward – 
i.e., that a Muslim, ultimately non-European Turkey was threatening the particular identity of 
the EU – is clearly not in line with the focus on universal norms and inclusionary participation 
that is assumed to guide a Civilian Power. 
In the case of Russia, the inherent tension between the different normative guidelines for a 
Civilian Power come to the fore, namely the tension between the preference for cooperation 
and inclusion and a substantial ‘value-orientation’ in terms of democracy and human rights. 
That German governments – the party-political composition notwithstanding – obviously 
privilege the former can be read as supporting the argument that Germany represents rather a 
‘trading state’ than a Civilian Power.
93
 The growing distance between Russia’s political 
reality and Germany’s normative preferences, however, does pose continuing problems for 
the German government. The German stance towards Russia – even if mainly shaped by 
economic interests – has to be at least presented as normatively appropriate for a Civilian 
Power. In this sense, the German government has argued, for example, that more than open 
criticism it is dialogue based on mutual trust that serves democracy in Russia – with Russia’s 
12 
 
democratic development seen as part of a comprehensive and long-term process of 
modernization.
94
 In this sense, the political foundations represent an ideal instrument for 
Germany to (semi-officially) promote democracy – including NGOs and political parties that 
belong to the opposition – with a long-term perspective without threatening trustful relations 





A cultural theory of democracy promotion traces the particular conceptions and practices of a 
given democracy promoter back to the political cultures of the individual country: ‘The more 
democracy promotion is seen as part of a liberal mission, the more coercive instruments will 
be applied; the more democracy is seen as something that has to grow from within society, the 
more low-key tools (if any) are preferred’.
96
 Civilian Powers in general and Germany in 
particular clearly belong to the latter camp. Democracy promotion, here, is based on a rather 
abstract and broad notion of universal values and rights; conceives of democratization as a 
long-term, evolutionary process of complex transformation; privileges pragmatic strategies of 
(institutional) cooperation and inclusion; and is relatively reluctant to openly meddle in other 
states’ affairs and infringe on their rights to sovereignty and self-determination.
97
 The present 
paper has developed these four features as part of a specific approach to democracy 
promotion that is in line with the general role conception of a Civilian Power. A review of the 
literature on German democracy promotion, a content analysis of German official documents 
and a brief comparison of German democracy promotion policies towards three different 
countries have shown that this Civilian Power approach to democracy promotion fits quite 
well the German case. 
This, however, is not to say that such ‘cultural’ predispositions explain German democracy 
promotion. Both the conceptual debate and the empirical case studies suggest that ‘political 
culture’ – as specified in the Civilian Power approach to democracy promotion – is relevant 
for, but surely does not determine foreign policy. Its causal effects operate more in the sense 
of constituting norms of appropriateness that constrain and enable.
98
 They constrain policy 
choices by requiring their justification in terms of certain normative guidelines. But in every 
single case, there is still a broad range of rather different interpretations and practices that can 
be seen or presented as in line with these guidelines. In addition, the range of potentially 
appropriate policies is further broadened by the fact that the normative guidelines are, at least 
partially, contradictory. In the case of democracy promotion, this refers particularly to the 
tension between a preference for cooperation, inclusion and non-interference (in the interest 
13 
 
of peace and in line with international sovereignty rights) and the explicit promotion of 
substantial values (in the interest of democracy and in line with international human rights 
norms). The same holds true, however, for tangible ‘material’ interests: Such interests have 
not only to be defined – and such definition depends on a particular ideational background. 
They themselves yield only a range of potentially appropriate policies: ‘Material’ interests 
constrain in the sense that some policy choices may be excluded because they clearly hurt 
those interests defined as vital, and they enable to the extent that different policies can be 
justified as serving them. 
In the case of German foreign policy, a politically reluctant, cooperative and long-term 
approach to democracy promotion seems to best fit both the cultural predispositions and the 
material interests the German government is representing. In terms of actual democracy 
promotion policies, this can still result in quite different practices on the ground. 
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